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T he combination of profound technological change and the 
emergence of powerful competitors such as China and the other bric 
countries has led to dramatic shifts in competitiveness and a tendency 
for production to be structured around global value chains. Against this 
background, traditional protectionist threats have reappeared and others 
have arisen in connection with new security requirements, private-sector 
quality standards, good practices and climate change. These issues are 
integral to the new competitive environment but could turn into protectionist 
barriers in the absence of the right multilateral approach. In view of this 
and of the current global crisis, the present paper offers some policy 
proposals oriented towards the adoption of an internationalization strategy 
in the region’s countries, emphasizing the importance of innovation and on 
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Over the past three decades, the international economy 
has been undergoing a rapid transition characterized 
by the advance of globalization, intense technological 
change and the rise of major new competitors such as 
China, India and the Asia-Pacific region in general. 
The implications of  these three developments are 
manifold and complex. They include, for example, 
dramatic changes in the global map of  trade and 
competitive advantage and the emergence of  new 
winners and losers among economic areas, countries, 
production sectors and firms. The scale of  these 
changes could even lead to some adjustments in the 
“centre-periphery” view of the world since, at least in 
its less refined versions, this does not accommodate 
the growing presence of  competitive developing 
countries that are increasingly making their presence 
felt in dynamic segments of the global economy and 
acting as drivers of technological change.
The slowdown in global economic growth observed 
so far would have been worse had it not been for the 
dynamism of major emerging markets such as those 
in the so-called bric group comprising Brazil, the 
Russian Federation, India and China, at least up to 
the first half  of 2008. These countries and emerging 
economies generally are now accounting for the bulk 
of world gross domestic product (gdp) growth and 
a substantial share of international trade. The bric 
countries are also gaining importance in the financial 
sphere, as they are playing an increasingly important 
role in sustaining global economic equilibria. Any hint 
as to what they (and particularly China) might do with 
their enormous reserves has immediate repercussions 
on global financial markets. Again, to be sustainable 
in the long run, any solution to the crisis would have 
to attribute a greater role to the bric countries and 
emerging economies in the system of international 
financial governance.
One of the most striking features of globalization 
is that financial flows are far larger and moving 
faster than real flows in the economy. This marked 
disparity, however, distracts attention from the equally 
spectacular changes taking place in global production 
and trade, which are critical to growth prospects in 
the coming years. It is on these changes that this 
article will focus. The severe repercussions of  the 
current global financial crisis do not invalidate these 
issues. The greatest damage to Latin America and the 
Caribbean from this crisis would come if  the region 
were to repeat the mistakes of adjustment policies 
in the 1980s by unnecessarily undermining growth 
and employment and, most critically, by sacrificing 
investment in infrastructure, education and innovation. 
These costs explain the widening of the gap between 
the region and the Asia-Pacific economies.
Despite the scale of the changes in the global 
economy, which have coincided with a strong expansion 
(2003-2007), the dangers of traditional protectionism 
—export subsidies and direct domestic support 
in agriculture, and antidumping arrangements, to 
name some of the most important— have yet to be 
avoided, while the uncertainty associated with the 
new international situation is hindering progress with 
multilateral trade negotiations and creating scope for 
the application of new types of protectionist measures. 
If  the global economy contracts in 2009 and 2010, 
it is not only the Doha Round that will be affected. 
In the context of an economic slowdown and credit 
crunch in the industrialized economies, the competitive 
challenges posed by emerging economies may trigger 
pressures for renewed forms of protectionism. There 
are new issues on the global agenda such as trade 
security, the links between trade, climate change and the 
environment and some competitiveness-related aspects 
such as certification of quality or good production 
practices which, if wrongly handled, could deepen these 
tendencies, particularly affecting exports of natural 
resources and natural resource-based manufactures.
The growing importance of  innovation and the 
expectation of a less dynamic international environment 
highlight the need to apply internationalization policies 
which focus on increasing the knowledge incorporated 
into exports and encouraging international alliances, 
the creation of international trade networks, a greater 
presence in global value chains, investment abroad, 
support for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(smes) that emphasizes access to the intangible aspects 
of  the new competitiveness and, in short, a more 
determined effort to train human resources that is 
commensurate with the intensity of the technological 
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To address the new global challenges, there is a pressing 
need to modify the institutional structure and mode of 
action of the World Trade Organization (wto). First, 
though, the Doha Round needs to be completed, not 
least because there would be less scope for significant 
wto reform if  it were to fail.
1. The need to complete the Doha round
Given the seriousness of the international situation 
resulting from the subprime crisis, there have been 
suggestions that the Doha Development Round 
should be postponed until a more propitious time. 
This would be the worst possible course of action. On 
the contrary, precisely because the crisis is so severe, 
negotiations need to be concluded as soon as possible, 
ensuring that the results are balanced and meet the 
declared goal of contributing to development. The 
need to complete the Doha Round becomes more 
urgent as the outlook for the world economy and 
trade in 2009 and 2010 deteriorates.
Awaiting better times before resuming the Doha 
Round negotiations would be particularly ill-advised 
for at least two reasons. First, because the process has 
coincided with the most favourable cycle in the world 
economy for the past 40 years (2003-2007), and yet 
no significant progress has been made in that period. 
Second, because the message sent out by suspending 
negotiations specifically with a view to resuming them 
only under better economic conditions would worsen 
the prospects for the world economy yet further by 
opening the way not only to measures that directly 
blocked trade but also to others that, under the pretext 
of supporting the sectors affected by the crisis, would 
lead to new sectoral disputes that would overload the 
wto dispute resolution system without allowing it to 
make progress with trade negotiations. This would 
be undesirable for the Organization, distracting it 
from the agreements process and forcing it to focus 
on conflicts.
The current international economic crisis, the worst 
in almost 80 years, poses a serious challenge to recent 
progress on trade liberalization, particularly because 
the two driving forces of globalization —trade and 
capital flows— will be depressed in 2009 and part of 
2010. The threat of protectionism is a challenge for 
the immediate future. In a scenario of simultaneous 
economic contraction in the United States, the European 
Union (eu) and Japan, with rising unemployment and 
tightening credit, the political authorities will find 
the pressure for subsidies and trade barriers difficult 
to resist. The debate on the enormous bailout for 
the United States automobile industry illustrates 
these dangers. If  other trading partners went down 
the same route, competitiveness would no longer be 
about quality and low costs but about the budgetary 
capacity of  governments. Sectoral bailouts of  this 
kind could damage international trade, since the 
entire global manufacturing sector is suffering from 
a drastic downturn in demand but special financial 
support programmes favour only certain segments 
of it. In a context of continuing weakness in global 
demand, support programmes could give rise to 
artificial competitive advantages derived exclusively 
from various forms of fiscal support.
The protectionist danger does not lie only in 
measures that could infringe wto commitments. After 
two decades of unilateral cuts, applied tariffs are well 
below consolidated ceilings agreed at the WTO. Indeed, 
countries could double tariffs without violating those 
commitments, which would lead to an 8% decline in 
international trade (The Economist, 2008a). This is 
precisely what it would take for the current crisis to 
turn into a depression of historic proportions. If  we 
have learnt anything from the depression of the 1930s 
it is that procyclical policies and protectionism served 
to make the problem worse and more protracted. The 
debate seems to have been going the right way so far, 
as was demonstrated at the Group of Twenty (G-20) 
meeting held in Washington, D.C. in November 2008. 
However, if  we examine the extent to which the three 
main commitments have been complied with so far, 
there is little room for optimism.1
1 Up until now, none of the 20 economies has met the commitment 
to apply a countercyclical fiscal policy and a programme of extra 
spending equivalent to up to 2% of  gdp; the commitment to 
complete the Doha Round in 2008 failed, while the agreement 
II
Uncertainty in the multilateral
trade environment
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2. reforming the world Trade Organization
The main wto reforms discussed are the following: 
(i) dealing with the erosion of basic non-discrimination 
principles (most-favoured-nation treatment and national 
treatment) that has resulted from the proliferation of 
preferential trade pacts and free-trade agreements, 
(ii) improving special and differential treatment for 
developing countries, particularly the least developed, 
(iii) improving coordination between the wto and 
multilateral financing agencies so that trade reforms 
are accompanied by financial assistance to developing 
countries, (iv) creating institutional mechanisms that 
allow decisions to be taken more quickly and efficiently 
and (v) strengthening the ties between the wto and 
civil society organizations (wto, 2004).
(a) Preserving non-discrimination
One of  the most striking features of  today’s 
international economy is the proliferation of bilateral 
or plurilateral free-trade agreements whose benefits, 
by definition, are confined to their signatories. They 
run counter to the principles of non-discrimination 
established by virtue of both most-favoured-nation 
treatment, which obliges wto members to give 
similar treatment to all trading partners, and national 
treatment, which requires them to give these partners 
the same treatment as local economic actors in certain 
respects. Agreements of  this type have been made 
possible by article XXIV of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (gatt), which permitted customs 
unions and free-trade agreements to exist subject 
to certain conditions.2 Hitherto, these conditions 
have been interpreted vaguely and countries have 
not shown any particular enthusiasm for defining 
them more precisely to ascertain how far the web of 
preferential agreements is compatible with gatt (now 
wto) requirements.
Because of  this proliferation of  free-trade 
agreements, the world is moving towards a situation in 
which most-favoured-nation treatment, from being the 
norm two decades ago, is now becoming the exception. 
to refrain from imposing new trade barriers for 12 months has 
already been broken by several of the governments participating 
in the summit.
2 The conditions are basically as follows: (i) that the creation of 
these groupings does not result in more restrictive tariff  barriers 
or trade regulations either between the members of a particular 
customs union or free-trade area or between them and non-member 
countries and (ii) that the trade agreements deriving from these 
customs unions or free-trade areas serve to remove the main 
obstacles to trade between the signatory countries.
If this comes about, the World Trade Organization will 
be severely weakened, as the bulk of trade flows will be 
governed by disciplines that, while similar to those of 
the wto, do not come under its authority. Countries 
signing agreements of this type must notify them to 
the wto, but this is a formality and the Organization 
does not have effective mechanisms for evaluating 
their internal effects and their repercussions on other 
partners.3 From this point of view, the more attractive 
option could be to start examining the possibility of 
improving links between the different agreements so 
that they become building blocks for free trade and not 
stumbling blocks, i.e., using preferential agreements to 
move towards the multilateralization of commitments 
and prevent them from turning into fortresses that 
block trade with non-members.
(b) Improving special and differential treatment 
provisions
Traditional mechanisms have consisted, first, 
in giving the least-developed developing countries 
more time to meet their commitments and, second, 
in allowing a significant range of their products to 
enter the markets of the main countries or groupings 
completely or partially tariff-free. The analysis by the 
group of  experts convened by the wto concluded 
that these provisions were inadequate and, in some 
cases, actually counterproductive. It was judged that 
the Generalized System of Preferences (gsp) applied, 
for example, by the United States and eu to exports 
from developing countries is ultimately ineffective 
for the following reasons: (i) because the benefits are 
concessionary and not binding, they are unstable 
and do not provide a basis for long-term investment 
planning, (ii) preferences are sometimes tied to 
obligations unrelated to trade, (iii) most benefits tend 
to go to the provider of the concessions, something 
that can be deduced from the number of products 
included and the margins of  preference granted,
(iv) benefits tend to have a low ceiling, with preferences 
being altered arbitrarily as the product involved 
becomes more competitive, and (v) there is a tendency 
3 It has been suggested that this aspect should be incorporated 
into the Trade Policy Review Mechanism to give the wto greater 
powers to evaluate the real contribution of free-trade agreements 
to the liberalization of  trade flows. However, this would mean 
screening the entire trade agenda, old issues as well as new, as this 
would be the only way to reduce the incentive to sign agreements 
of this type. But this is highly unlikely and everything suggests 
that the trend towards free-trade agreements will continue over 
the coming years.
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for beneficiary countries to become over-reliant on 
these preferences and slacken their efforts to diversify 
exports (wto, 2004).
There is scope, then, to recast the concept of special 
and differential treatment by linking it more closely to 
the issues of trade assistance and facilitation and by 
providing developing countries with the resources they 
need to improve and expand their infrastructure, their 
exportable product baskets, their education systems 
and their worker training, as well as groupings of smes 
and their access to credit and new technology. This 
requires a closer and more functional relationship 
between the wto and multilateral financing agencies 
such as the World Bank and regional banks so that 
resources can be made available to buttress trade 
reforms with the infrastructure, human resources 
and technology needed to complement them. Trade 
agreements, discriminatory or not, only generate 
opportunities for higher demand if  the necessary 
exporting capacity is available. This need to expand 
and diversify the range of exportable products is even 
greater in the least-developed developing countries. 
In the renewal of special and differential treatment, 
in short, the emphasis should be shifted from export 
demand to export supply.
(c) Improving the workings of the wto
Another subject for debate is the decision-making 
procedure of the World Trade Organization, as decisions 
are taken by consensus and not by vote. Each of 
these methods has pros and cons,4 but what is being 
discussed now is the need to make mechanisms more 
responsive and ministerial meetings more efficient, 
and to strengthen high-level political participation. 
Consideration has been given to forms of “variable 
geometry” that would allow commitments to apply only 
to those who originally supported them, but with room 
for multilateralization as new partners sign up.
Other concerns include making progress with 
transparency rules and improving links with civil 
society organizations by publicizing wto functions 
and activities more vigorously and providing training 
and technical assistance on trade rules to governments, 
academia, employers’ organizations and the media. 
The dispute resolution mechanism —one of  the 
Organization’s most highly regarded— is among the 
few multilateral forums in which the complaints of 
developing countries have not only been heard, but in 
many cases have led to changes in the industrialized-
country policies they challenged.5
The main contribution of the wto to a stronger 
world economy consists in a set of trade disciplines 
ensuring that predictable ground rules are applied and 
preventing backsliding at times of crisis or economic 
contraction or slowdown like the present. In the absence 
of initiatives to restart the Doha Round, greater efforts 
should be made to identify and publicize the trade 
implications of the financial crisis by recording the 
protectionist measures being taken by the Organization’s 
members, irrespective of whether they comply with 
current rules. These efforts should also document 
the amount of resources involved and the costs the 
measures represent for developing countries. Much 
the same could be done for the cost of protectionist 
measures applied by these same countries and their 
distributive effects, whose main victims are usually 
lower-income groups. This awareness-raising effort 
would alert the international community to trade 
developments and help wto members appreciate the 
need to resume the Doha Round negotiations.
5 An overview of wto disputes can be obtained by consulting 
the Integrated Database of  Trade Disputes for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (idatd) prepared by the eclac Division of 
International Trade and Integration [online] http://badicc.eclac.
cl or http:www.cepal.org/comercio, both of which contain links 
to English versions.
4 See wto (2004) for a more detailed discussion.
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The acceleration of  technological change and its 
repercussions for the competitive hierarchy of firms, 
conglomerates and nations is tending to manifest 
itself  in the appearance of new trade issues affecting 
competitiveness, although many of them have yet to 
be addressed in multilateral trade rules.
The rules on trade security brought in unilaterally 
by certain countries, or recommended by multilateral 
organizations such as the World Customs Organization 
(wco), have created strong pressures for institutional 
and operational improvements throughout the chain 
of trade activities. In this context, private-sector rules 
have been developed whose application is voluntary 
but which can affect countries’ competitiveness. 
They include good practices in agriculture, safety 
certification, the rules of the International Organization 
for Standardization (iso) and quality certification. 
The influence of  environmentalist and consumer 
movements has also grown, particularly in Europe, and 
this has had indirect consequences for international 
trade by increasing requirements for the safety and 
“traceability” of  food products in industrialized-
country markets. Lastly, mention should be made of 
the environmental and climatic effects of economic 
and international trade growth.
The multilateral trading system has by no means 
kept up with the speed of technological change or 
with unilateral initiatives backed largely by the new 
system of business actors from the private sector whose 
influence on trade issues is often greater than that of 
industrialized-country governments themselves. This 
interaction of technological and business developments 
with new trade issues and institutions is complex, 
combining requirements arising from technological 
progress, such as quality certification, and business 
models based on technological change that set out to 
limit competition and protect private-sector activities, 
such as certification requirements associated with 
specific laboratories and firms.
The boundaries between technological progress, 
new issues, the creation of new agencies and institutions 
and protectionism are blurred and can easily be 
overstepped, particularly if  developing countries do 
not have the technical capacity to distinguish changes 
inherent in technological change or new modalities 
of  trade (like global value chains), to which they 
need to adjust, from what are merely novel ways of 
transacting private-sector business that may hinder 
competition or encourage protectionism.
1. Security in international trade
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, security 
rules gained importance in international relations 
and began to affect trade regulations owing, in 
particular, to the need to prevent the global supply 
chain from being used for terrorist purposes. This led 
to the creation of  the Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (c-tpat) in the United States 
(2002), the Authorized Economic Operator (aeo) 
programme of  the World Customs Organization 
(2005) and the Partners in Protection programme 
of Canada, all designed to secure supply channels.6 
The new trade security programmes take in not just 
products themselves but also the proper handling and 
traceability of  cargo right along the supply chain, 
on the basis that “the security of a transport chain 
depends upon its weakest link” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2003).
Complying with the new requirements brings new 
costs; furthermore, they depend on the situation of the 
firm and the level of certification demanded.7 These 
measures may adversely affect small and medium-
sized producers, since if  they are not able to comply 
with the requirements of  these programmes they 
risk losing markets as they cease to be competitive 
relative to firms which do comply, whose goods enter 
not only more rapidly but with stronger security 
guarantees. Thus, products no longer compete just 
III
The new protectionist threats
in the twenty-first century
6 See eclac (2008a, chapter III) for a more detailed account of 
these initiatives.
7 This encompasses, for example, physical security measures at the 
firm, cargo protection, staff security procedures, staff identification 
and monitoring systems and electronic communication and 
database systems.
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on quality and price but also on security, a variable 
whose importance for access to more sophisticated 
markets could increase further.
2. Private-sector rules on food quality and 
safety
There is growing concern about food safety and 
the possibility of  accidental contamination. One 
consequence of the globalization of agrifood chains 
is that they have started to include production links 
which operate under different national institutional 
standards, including the quality of  sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulation, cross-border protection 
and even the efficiency and honesty of  officials. 
Although food safety has improved greatly in recent 
decades, progress at the individual country level has 
been uneven, so that there are still major outbreaks 
of  disease transmitted by foods which have been 
contaminated with micro-organisms, chemicals or 
toxins. Thus, the cross-border trade in contaminated 
foods may be contributing to the spread of  such 
outbreaks (who, 2007).
Voluntary quality standards have increased 
both in quantity and in strictness, with a view to 
ensuring product safety and corporate commitment 
to protection of the environment and employment 
rights, among other things. Several public and private 
institutions that oversee safety and sustainability 
are promoting concepts and programmes of  good 
practice in agriculture and manufacturing, together 
with different actors in the agrifood chain.8
In addition, in recent years multiple organizations 
have emerged to promote the concept of “fair trade” 
and private certification, i.e., the granting of labels 
guaranteeing that a particular product has been 
produced in accordance with their standards. There are 
currently 20 certified fair trade initiatives, most of them 
in Europe and North America, whose objective is to 
regulate the use of product certification labelling.9
To participate in global value chains, it is of course 
necessary to meet international quality standards. 
Complying with the relevant voluntary private 
standards can facilitate access to the more profitable 
segments of these chains. Sometimes, however, the 
concept of “fair trade” may turn into protectionism, 
particularly when the aim is to impose specific business 
practices from industrialized economies, even though 
they may be no better than those in developing 
countries. Another unfair trading practice, which is not 
emphasized enough, is the agricultural protectionism 
in industrialized economies. In other cases, quality 
certification itself  can become an attractive business 
and relax its original focus on upholding quality 
standards throughout the value chain. The proliferation 
of private standards and the growing market demand 
for them, particularly in the food sector, is forcing 
exporters to turn to a quality certification market that 
is lacking in transparency, has considerable barriers 
to entry and suffers from certain conflicts of interest 
between these agencies and the leading producers in 
the central economies. This being so, it is worrisome 
that what were originally private, voluntary standards 
originating in major global consortia are tending to 
become predominant in international markets, whether 
because of gradual de facto multilateralization, their 
great influence in key markets or the oligopolistic 
nature of certification agencies.
In some cases, governments wholly or partly 
adopt private-sector quality requirements and pursue 
standardization, which means that, in practice, these 
requirements can become compulsory. In this way, 
the agricultural sector, and exporters in particular, are 
forced to adapt to many requirements of both a public 
and a private character (Salles de Almeida, 2008).10
3. The trade effects of private standards
The adoption of private standards (in addition to 
compulsory official norms) is both a challenge and an 
opportunity for the region’s countries, as compliance 
with these may become a de facto prerequisite for 
exporting agricultural products to markets that are more 
environmentally aware and increasingly demanding 
about quality. Even though compliance with rules 
may create greater opportunities to access stringent 
8 “Good agricultural practices” are the measures applied in the 
production, processing and transportation of agricultural products 
to ensure product safety and protection for the environment and 
workers.
9 These initiatives are members of Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International (flo), an association that provides direct support to 
certified producers by defining the parameters of what is deemed 
“fair trade”. Working on the basis of iso standards for certification 
bodies, flo inspects and certifies some 500 producers’ organizations 
in over 50 countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America.
10 Among the most important are iso rules on organic production, 
safety, good practice, denomination of origin and geographical 
descriptions.
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markets, they may also act as trade barriers because 
of the costs they represent, especially for developing-
country suppliers. They could also be protectionist 
if  their requirements exceed those established in the 
wto Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (sps Agreement). By and 
large, agricultural exporters in developing countries 
are uncomfortable with the proliferation of private 
standards. In this area, the wto distinguishes between 
concerns about content and concerns about compliance 
(see table 1).
The main concerns raised at the wto relate to 
the relationship between private-sector organizations 
and international standards organizations (private 
standards are generally stricter than international 
ones), certain unnecessary trade restrictions imposed 
by private-sector norms (especially for small farmers), 
the measures governments could adopt to ensure 
that private-sector organizations comply with the sps 
Agreement, and their relationship with other areas 
of  wto work, such as technical barriers to trade. 
Another concern is the lack of transparency of private 
standards, as they are not notified to the wto.
With regard to good agricultural practices, 
developing countries face three major challenges: 
(i) ensuring that the interests of small producers are 
considered in standards relating to both product 
safety and the sustainability of domestic production, 
since excessively strict requirements could drive out 
small producers, (ii) ensuring that producers are not 
overloaded with practices and norms which, while not 
legally binding, in practice condition market access, 
and (iii) monitoring their effects on production, 
certification and marketing costs, particularly for 
smaller producers.
4. The implications of climate change for the 
trading system
Climate change will be one of the main challenges 
facing the international community over the coming 
years. The trading system is a source of tension, given 
potential conflicts between climate change and the basic 
principles of international trade: non-discrimination, 
removal of quantitative restrictions, and non-arbitrary 
discrimination. Governments have begun to draw 
up specific legislation to comply with international 
obligations in this area, particularly those deriving 
from the Kyoto Protocol. If  this legislation fails to 
take basic wto principles into account, members will 
probably try to settle their differences through the 
dispute settlement mechanism, which will increase 
the cost of cooperation and intensify opposition to 
the workings of the multilateral system based on wto 
rules (Hufbauer, 2008).
Different initiatives have arisen in the developed 
countries to deal with the link between climate 
change and trade by implementing “offsetting border 
measures” (Brewer, 2007). In 2007 and 2008, different 
legislative proposals were discussed in the European 
Union and the United States to address these issues. 
The initiatives range from the possible application 
of tariff  surcharges varying by the contribution of 
each product’s entire supply chain to the “greenhouse 
effect” (or its equivalent, the requirement to purchase 
international emissions permits) to new areas for “green” 
TABLE 1
Concerns about the application of private sanitary and phytosanitary standards
Content-related Compliance-related
Multiplication of  private standards systems within and 
between markets.
Cost of  third-party certification, particularly for small 
and medium-sized enterprises and farmers in developing 
countries.
Unclear boundary between official and private sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards.
Requirement of  some private systems that only designated 
certification bodies be used.
Relationship between private systems and the international 
standardization institutions mentioned in the Agreement on 
the Application of  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
Lack of  equivalence between systems, so that certification 
audits have to be repeated.
Scientific justification for certain prescriptions relating to 
production processes and methods.
Non-recognition of  certificates issued or lack of  accredited 
certification bodies in developing countries.
Source: World Trade Organization (wto), Private Standards and the sps Agreement (g/sps/gen/746), Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, Geneva, 24 January 2007.
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subsidies, trade defence mechanisms (safeguards and 
antidumping) or even a “level playing field” for emissions 
requirements. If  they lead to measures to keep local 
industries competitive with imports, these proposals 
could severely affect international trade.11
A review of the initiatives mentioned reveals an 
interesting paradox. The proposals of the United States, 
a country that has not signed up to the Kyoto Protocol, 
are not only unilateral but tend to be considerably 
stricter than those of the European Union, which focus 
mainly on environmental subsidies and adaptation 
of the wto regulatory framework to the challenges 
of  climate change. If  the region is not adequately 
prepared for this debate and any negotiations that 
ensue, it could find once again that it has arrived too 
late and that after a few years it is having to adjust to 
global standards that take no account of its interests, 
involving energy and environmental standards that 
may constrain its competitiveness.
5. A space for regional cooperation
The international agenda requires greater cooperation 
between countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
to improve their position in the global economy. This 
not only means agreeing on regional mechanisms to 
mitigate the effects of the international financial crisis, 
but also requires them to address the challenges of 
competitiveness and innovation, which will certainly 
have a greater medium- and long-term impact on the 
living conditions of most people in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (eclac, 2008b).
The issues considered above, namely security, 
best practices, private quality standards and climate 
change may be diverted into protectionist channels. 
This is why Latin America and the Caribbean should 
address these aspects in regional forums and take steps 
to increase technical and institutional preparedness so 
that countries can adopt common positions on matters 
of growing importance to international trade.
Trade security is a good area in which to coordinate 
the region’s trade facilitation and assistance efforts 
by establishing synergies between governments and 
employers’ organizations in the region and by sharing 
information both on outside markets and on the 
steps being taken in each country, so that positions 
can be coordinated. For example, mutual recognition 
agreements with leading trade partners could be 
approached in a more coordinated fashion, since if  
the region succeeded in reaching common standards 
and finalizing a set of  internal agreements on the 
matter it could improve its negotiating position vis-à-
vis its main partners while at the same time boosting 
intraregional trade.
The region’s governments could also share 
information on the main restrictions facing their 
products in industrialized markets owing to the 
application of private standards that ultimately affect 
competitiveness. This could facilitate joint negotiations 
with governments or private-sector groupings in those 
countries or to subregional trade facilitation projects 
making it possible to adapt to the main trends in the 
international scene.
In this context, regional integration is urgently 
needed. In addition to the traditional arguments for 
it, the requirements imposed by the current phase 
of globalization have created new needs for strategic 
international partnerships in the fields of production 
planning, logistics, marketing, innovation and 
technology. The standards of  competitiveness and 
technological innovation are rising, while the rapid 
development of China, India and other Asian countries 
is radically redrawing the global trade map both for 
goods and services and for capital and comparative 
advantage. Larger markets, legal certainty, compatible 
standards and connectivity are now indispensable for 
growth with equity. In short, convergence between 
integration schemes is crucial to a renewed open 
regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(eclac, 1992, 1994, 2006a, 2006b and 2008a).
11 See eclac (2008a, chapter III) for a review of  these 
proposals.
84
gLobALIzATIon And ThE nEW InTERnATIonAL TRAdE EnVIRonmEnT  •  osVALdo RosALEs V.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 7  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 9
One of  the most striking features of  the global 
economy in the first decade of  the twenty-first 
century is the consolidated presence of a number of 
developing economies among the leading players on the 
international stage. The most interesting phenomenon 
has undoubtedly been the emergence of China as a 
global actor and of Asia as the continent that has 
attained the highest growth rate in human history. 
The situation is best described by Larry Summers 
in the introduction to Mahbubani’s excellent book 
charting the shift of power towards Asia.12
1. The importance of China in the global 
economy
The economic expansion of China has been spectacular: 
in 1980-2008 the country grew at an average annual 
rate of 9.9%, much higher than the 2.8% achieved by 
Latin America and the Caribbean. In consequence, 
China ranks second behind the United States in 
total gdp measured at purchasing power parity and 
third behind the United States and Japan in nominal 
dollar terms. Every important international indicator 
captures the growing presence of  China in global 
aggregates. This has created a new configuration in 
which the production chains of the Asia-Pacific region 
are organized around China. The country is actively 
strengthening its trade links with Africa and Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The Asian economies 
hold 60% of the world’s international reserves and 
53% of United States Treasury securities, and their 
large current-account surpluses contribute to the 
stability of the global economy. They are at the heart 
of  a prospering South-South trading system that 
accounts for 41% of  all developing-country trade 
(eclac, 2008c).
Changes in global export rankings reveal the 
extraordinary competitive leap made by China, which 
rose from eleventh place in 1995 to second in 2007 
(and first in 2008, according to unconfirmed figures). 
Exports of manufactures and services rose at similar 
rates (see table 2).
The emergence of China as a global player has 
been boosted by its ability to forge alliances with other 
emerging economies in the areas both of trade (the G-20 
group of agricultural developing countries organized 
by Brazil at the Doha Round) and of finance (it has 
been invited to the other G-20, which should create 
the template for reform of the international financial 
system). All this was made more widely known by 
a Goldman Sachs (2003) study that introduced the 
concept of the bric countries.13
IV
The emergence of new competitors: the brics
TABLE 2
Selected countries: changes in global export rankings
(Positions in the ranking)
 Goods and services Goods Manufactures Services
 1995 2007 1995 2007 1995 2006 1995 2007
United States 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1
China 11 3 9 2 9 2 8 5
Germany 2 2 2 1 2 1 3 3
Japan 3 4 3 4 3 4 5 6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac), on the basis of  official World Trade Organization 
(wto) figures.
12 The Industrial Revolution was so called because, for the first time 
in human history, living standards improved fast enough for the 
change – amounting perhaps to 50% – to be observable in the span 
of a single lifetime. At current growth rates, Asian living standards 
could rise 100-fold, or 10,000%, in a lifetime. The emergence of 
Asia and everything that is coming will feature prominently in the 
history books written in 300 years’ time, pushing the cold war and 
the rise of Islam into the background (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 10).
13 These countries account for 43% of the global population, 27% 
of global gdp, 11% of world goods and services exports and 16% 
of global foreign direct investment flows (Fitzgerald, 2007).
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The remarkable expansion of  China is well 
known, but what is interesting about the study is the 
information it provides on developments in the other 
brics, forecasting not only that by 2043 the gdp of  
China would surpass that of the United States, but 
also that by 2040 the countries of the European Union 
would have dropped out of the group of the world’s 
leading industrialized economies (G-8), being displaced 
by China, India and Brazil (see table 3).
TABLE 3
ranking of the world’s leading economies, 
2000-2040
(Ranked by gdp)
 2000 2020 2030 2040
1 U. States U. States U. States U. States
2 Japan China China China
3 Germany Japan Japan India
4 U. Kingdom Germany India Japan
5 France U. Kingdom Russian Fed. Russian Fed.
6 Italy India Germany Brazil
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of information from 
Goldman Sachs (2003), “Dreaming with brics: the path to 2050”, 
Global Economics Paper, No. 99, New York, October 2003.
Over 40% of the strong expansion of the global 
economy in the 2003-2007 cycle was due to growth 
in the brics, a figure that could rise to 70% in 2009 
given the recession in the central economies. Indeed, it 
was due to the dynamism of the emerging economies 
—of which the brics are leading members— that 
the world economy was not in recession in 2008. The 
bric economies were responsible for the greatest 
investment boom in history14 and thus for the rise 
in energy and commodity prices experienced up 
to September 2008, before Lehman Brothers went 
bankrupt and the subprime crisis unfolded into a 
global financial crisis.
The export presence of the brics rose from 7% 
of global goods exports and 3% of services exports a 
decade ago to 13% and 8%, respectively, in 2006 (see 
figures 1 and 2). In 2007, the bric countries held 38% 
of all international reserves (see figure 3), while China 
(21.3%), the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
the United Arab Emirates and Singapore generated 
almost 40% of global savings (see figure 4), half  of 
which were used to finance dissaving in the United 
States. These figures indicate not only the scale of 
the issues that need to be addressed when reforming 
the international financial system but also the fact 
that, to be sustainable in the long run, any solution 
will have to give a greater say on global financial 
governance to the brics and emerging economies 
(Rosales, 2008).
2. The brics and the centre-periphery concept 
in the early twenty-first century
According to this widely accepted concept, the global 
economy is made up of  two great groupings that 
interact with each other: the centre and the periphery. 
Their production structures are dissimilar, being 
heterogeneous and specialized in the periphery and 
homogeneous and diversified in the centre. These 
differences determine the nature of trade and technology 
transfers in the global economy. In the long run, the 
argument goes, the economic evolution of each system 
causes the periphery to fall further behind in terms of 
production and technology, while its terms of trade 
deteriorate (Rodríguez, 1980).15
However compelling this may be as a holistic 
interpretation, it is clear that the “centre-periphery” 
concept does not capture the realities of international 
trade today. For one thing, the experience of China 
and a number of Asian economies has shown that 
convergence with the income levels of  the central 
economies, while slow, is possible. However, it could be 
argued that this convergence has been possible precisely 
because these economies challenged the primary-export 
pattern, venturing into the export of manufactures and 
14 In the last three years, about half  the world’s infrastructure 
investment is estimated to have taken place in emerging economies, 
which have allocated 6% of gdp to investments in roads, electricity, 
railways and telecommunications. This rate of investment relative 
to output is more than double that of the industrialized nations. 
It is calculated that, in real terms, China has invested more in 
five years than it did in the whole of the twentieth century (The 
Economist, 2008b).
15 The argument is that the large capital goods-producing sectors 
in the central countries give them access to technological progress, 
and the advantages of  this spread throughout their economies 
thanks to their more integrated societies and more powerful 
unions. In the periphery, on the other hand, new technologies are 
basically imported because capital goods production is marginal 
if  not non-existent and is confined to the export sector, which in 
turn is restricted to the primary sector. Thus, excess labour keeps 
wages low, preventing the periphery from retaining the fruits of 
its limited technical progress. In this way, higher productivity in 
the primary-export sector ends up being transferred to the centre 
because of the worsening terms of trade.
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FIGURE 1
bric countries: share of world goods exports
(Percentages)
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FIGURE 2
bric countries: share of world services exports
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac), on the basis of  data from the Organisation for 













1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
87
gLobALIzATIon And ThE nEW InTERnATIonAL TRAdE EnVIRonmEnT  •  osVALdo RosALEs V.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 7  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 9
FIGURE 4
Structure of global saving, 2007
(Percentages of the totala)
 EXPORTERS OF CAPITAL (SAVING) IMPORTERS OF CAPITAL (DISSAVING)
FIGURE 3
bric countries: international reserves
(Percentages of the world total)
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gradually increasing their technology content. Indeed, 
the “peripheral” economies have shown themselves able 
to draw closer to the technology frontier in a variety 
of areas as they have come to play an important role 
in the global economy as exporters of manufactures, 
services or particular technologies.
If  the above argument is accepted, then a first 
step would be to incorporate into the analysis the 
fact that there are two subgroups in the periphery, 
a traditional one and an innovative one, capable of 
competing successfully in the global arena of  the 
knowledge economy. The next thing would be to 
consider what forms the links between the two periphery 
subgroups might take, i.e., whether it is possible that 
intra-periphery relations might also be marginalizing 
for economies on the periphery that have not yet 
migrated away from natural resource exports. This 
theoretical concern is of great importance at a time 
when economic and trade ties between China and Latin 
America are intensifying (Rosales and Kuwayama, 
2007), when South-South trade has become the engine 
of the global economy and when the growth prospects 
of the Chinese economy are increasingly important 
for many Latin American economies.16
V
Towards an internationalization strategy
The global economic context at the end of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century is characterized by 
rapid technological change, the emergence of aggressive 
new global competitors and the marked changes in 
competitiveness and protectionist threats that have 
ensued. The sectors most reliant on natural resources 
or low-skilled labour will be increasingly exposed 
to traditional and renewed forms of protectionism, 
and this will have a significant effect on production 
and external trade activities. The countries that are 
quickest to grasp this situation and apply the right 
policies to adapt will be better placed to participate 
successfully in the international economy.17
1. The global context
Over the coming years, we shall see an acceleration of 
scientific innovation and technological change, driven by 
progress in computing, information and communication 
technologies, biotechnology, nanotechnologies and 
neurosciences or cognitive sciences (Kelly, 2005). 
The conjunction of increased computer processing 
capacity, faster and more efficient broadband, the 
development of satellite technologies and the Global 
Positioning System (gps), wireless technologies, better 
heat, torsion, vibration and tension sensors in the 
field of robotics, new materials and brain sciences 
has actually led to the emergence of new fields of 
knowledge.18 These changes are radical enough in 
themselves, but the greatest novelty is the increasing 
speed with which the new knowledge is being applied 
to production and exports, shortening product and 
corporate strategy cycles.
This technological convergence will be more 
profound than the digital convergence we have 
experienced over the past 25 years, radically altering 
the outlook for civilization and, of course, considerably 
affecting production and international trade. The 
explosiveness of  this conjunction of technological 
innovations is well captured by the expression 
“technological big bang”.19
A review of the effects of this innovation synergy 
on the production structure shows, naturally enough, 
the importance of innovation as the hub of policies 
to improve productivity. In the sphere of production, 
leading innovations include process digitalization, 
16 See eclac (2008c) for a full account of economic and trade 
relations between Latin America and China (an electronic version 
is available at www.cepal.org/comercio).
17 As the Prime Minister of Singapore put it: “As a small country 
with no natural resources, Singapore has long known that we have 
no choice but to make the mastery of knowledge our competitive 
advantage” (Lee, 2008).
18 They include biocomputing (application of biological principles and 
processes to the development of new technologies such as biological 
computer programs and dna computing), proteomics (study of 
how proteins can be combined to cure diseases) and biomimicry 
(technologies that replicate biological activity) (Kelly, 2005).
19 The word bang is an acronym for bits (information technologies), 
atoms (nanotechnologies), neurones (cognitive sciences) and genes 
(biotechnologies).
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barcodes, outsourcing, insourcing, offshoring, online 
connection, the sharing of information with suppliers 
and distributors and online innovation, processes that 
in turn require a permanent connection or connectivity 
infrastructure, the organization of global networks and 
rapid and appropriate responses (Friedman, 2005). 
The processes described affect not only production but 
also the fields of goods logistics, transport, security 
and traceability and thence international trade.
Technological change has combined with the 
liberalization of financial flows and the gradual opening 
up of markets to trade and investment to speed up the 
dynamic of innovation, the convergence of international 
standards and corporate strategies and the tendency 
for production to be organized around global value 
chains (oecd, 2005 and 2008). The latter have resulted 
in the geographical fragmentation of  production 
processes, made possible by the growing digitalization 
of many activities, greater internationalization and 
commercialization of services and the reduction of 
transport and logistics costs. This has also stimulated 
specialization, innovation in selected activities and 
the creation of  new firms and capabilities. The 
internationalization of  services and the explosive 
growth of  service-sector outsourcing have helped 
create a global supply of skilled activities in the fields 
of design, consultancy and the manufacture of specific 
inputs. This has made possible the emergence of 
new firms that are internationally competitive in the 
provision of strategic services and obviates the need 
to invest heavily in global infrastructure to penetrate 
global markets, or in the learning of complex business 
techniques (Hamel, 2007).
Global value chains encompass everything from 
research and development to product recycling, taking 
in production, support services, distribution, marketing, 
finance and after-sales services along the way. The 
objective of these chains is to increase the knowledge 
content at every stage, since this determines the value 
per unit produced. Consequently, the current debate 
on competitiveness is giving greater importance to 
the “intangible” aspects that contribute most to the 
knowledge-intensity of each segment of the global 
value chain, namely quality, timeliness, connectivity, 
patentability and trademark registration, traceability, 
safety, environmental conservation and energy 
efficiency. All these attributes are what provide the 
basis for product differentiation and thence access 
to the most lucrative sectors of demand and a more 
functional link with trends in technological change 
and international demand.
2. Some policy orientations
It is suggested here that the objectives of  policies 
to improve the position of the Latin America and 
Caribbean countries in the international economy 
cannot be measured solely by the level of exports as 
a share of gdp. Attention also needs to be paid to 
their composition (and particularly their knowledge 
content), the way they are integrated with the rest of 
the production system and their contribution to the 
progressive homogenization of productivity levels in 
the economy. The opportunity now exists to reverse the 
region’s well-known “structural heterogeneity”, always 
provided that public policies set out decisively to use 
access to new technologies to narrow the productivity 
gaps between firms and sectors. Without substantive 
efforts in this direction, the level of  technological 
heterogeneity will tend to increase, making it less and 
less viable to reconcile growth with progress on equity. 
Furthermore, policies to improve the international 
position of the region’s economies need to give more 
room to measures favouring the internationalization 
of firms and their contacts, since this is where the 
opportunities for higher growth and better access to 
innovation sources lie.
(a) From trade liberalization and export 
orientation to internationalization strategies
International trade and investment policies have 
evolved from market opening in the 1980s to an export-
oriented approach. However, the emergence of global 
value chains and the growing importance of innovation 
in production and foreign trade activities now require a 
further step: the application of policies oriented explicitly 
towards internationalization, including training of skilled 
human resources, efforts to stimulate production clusters, 
innovation programmes and measures to attract foreign 
direct investment (fdi), which brings technology and 
know-how to specific sectors or activities. Only then 
will it be possible to capture significant shares of the 
major international markets and keep up the pace of 
innovation needed to preserve the competitive positions 
that have been won.
Internationalization strategies need to favour the 
creation of international partnerships and networks 
in different areas so that local production activities 
which participate in global value chains can move up 
the hierarchy to the most profitable links via a range 
of investments that raise their knowledge content. 
This means, for example, strengthening the links 
between goods and services trade and investment, 
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placing innovation at the heart of  competitiveness 
policies and using public-private alliances to stimulate 
it. These would improve the prospects of  progress 
with the adoption of  production methods that 
serve to strengthen the linkages between primary, 
manufacturing and service activities, diversify the 
production and export base and increase the direct 
or indirect presence of smes in that export dynamic, 
always with an eye to a more balanced distribution 
of productivity growth.
(b) From participation in international trade to 
participation in global value chains
While the earlier goal of internationally oriented 
economic policies might have been to boost trade, the 
importance of technological innovation now means 
there is a need to stimulate the introduction of new 
technologies and participation in global value chains. 
This means, for example, that trade policy (centring in 
this first decade of the twenty-first century on trade 
negotiations and the signing of free-trade agreements) 
should now be oriented towards administering these 
agreements from a strategic perspective. To this end, 
they should be treated as a form of alliance with major 
partners in the spheres of investment and technological 
progress, facilitating the creation of joint programmes 
in the areas concerned and the possibility of making 
joint investments in neighbouring markets. The idea 
is to use trade agreements as a platform for attracting 
fdi into technology-intensive sectors and, at the same 
time, for increasing the presence of the country’s firms 
in international innovation networks, technology 
businesses and global value chains. In summary, trade 
policy needs to be a tool at the service of the strategy 
of international participation in innovation networks 
and technology businesses.
(i) From research and development to a flow of 
innovation, investment and marketing (from R&D to 
I&I&M). This means that instead of the traditional 
concept of  research and development (R&D), 
what needs to be adopted is an approach based on 
a continuous flow of  innovation, investment and 
marketing (I&I&M), i.e., of knowledge that quickly 
feeds through to investment and production and is 
introduced into the international market via new 
products, processes or strategies.20 This means taking 
a more proactive approach to trademarks and patents 
by encouraging economic actors to obtain and export 
patents and, through them, knowledge. The incentive 
structure ought to reflect this orientation, so that the 
scientific community perceives that a patent brings 
greater rewards than an academic study. Furthermore, 
a closer relationship between firms, universities and 
technology centres would make it possible to develop 
the idea of  a “technology business” benefiting all 
participants in the alliance, as compared with the 
current concept of the “research project” financed 
out of public funds and tied only somewhat tenuously 
—if at all— to the realm of production.
(ii) Prioritizing innovation and putting it on 
the business agenda. Innovation has become the 
cornerstone of successful international strategies. It is 
a broader concept than that of traditional research and 
development. It includes everything from technology 
copying and adaptation to product and process 
research, new business models and marketing, finance 
and logistics activities leading to the creation of new 
realizable value —ideally in the international market— 
via different forms of brand differentiation, i.e., the 
“decommodification” of products or services.
In the region’s case, priority should be given to 
innovation in natural resource processing firms, without 
neglecting new industries, particularly those related to 
biotechnology and information and communication 
technologies. There is no “Chinese wall” between 
activities of this type. On the contrary, biotechnology is 
the basis of the new knowledge, accounts for much of the 
value added to natural resources and makes it possible 
to commercialize new products in the agribusiness, 
forestry, aquaculture and mining sectors.
Again, the subject of innovation should be higher 
up the business agenda. To achieve this, there should be 
public policies to support sme organizations (e.g., by 
financing hours of work by professionals specializing 
in the topic) with a view to encouraging collaboration 
by smes on different innovation measures. It would 
also be helpful for the leading employers’ organizations 
to appoint innovation, investment and marketing 
representatives and develop work programmes and 
schemes to connect their members to technology 
centres and universities in the country and abroad. 
A wide range of  grants, reports, placements and 
research projects are needed to strengthen relationships 
between academia and the sphere of production and 
foreign trade.
(iii) Strengthening the links between goods, services 
and investments. As they have been increasingly 
20 I am indebted for the term I&I&M to Ángel Flisfisch, a former 
Chilean ambassador to Singapore, who used it in some notes to 
the Office of International Economic Affairs of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in 2002 or thereabouts.
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incorporated into value chains, services have become 
the main component of product value added. This 
is particularly true of consultancy, advertising and 
marketing, legal assistance, accounting and finance, 
information and communication technologies and 
quality engineering and control services, among 
others. Owing to the spread of the new technologies, 
competitive advantages now tend to be expressed in 
“international value networks”. At the top of these 
chains are “knowledge”-intensive aspects such as 
trademarks, patents, quality and copyright, while 
further down are activities that are more natural 
resource-intensive, involve less processing and employ 
less skilled labour. Widespread access to modern 
services for firms, particularly smes, is a crucial driver 
of productivity.
It is not realistic, therefore, to separate the 
competitiveness of  goods from the availability 
on demand of  competitively-priced services of 
international quality or access to modern product, 
process or management technologies, which are 
usually incorporated into foreign direct investment. 
Public policies should facilitate access to these services 
at something close to international cost and quality 
standards, while promoting exports of business services 
in which the country has or can acquire competitive 
advantages (engineering, architecture, consulting, 
construction, communications, design, audio-visual 
techniques, health care, etc.).21
(iv) Making investment abroad a public policy goal. 
Investments abroad follow firms’ own internationalization 
cycle, once they have ventured into international markets 
with some degree of success. Successful goods and 
services exporters quickly find that the returns on the 
different elements in the value chain associated with 
a particular product (production, logistics, transport, 
distribution, marketing) vary with the knowledge-
intensity of each segment in that chain. Consequently, 
the next step in the natural evolution of export activities, 
particularly natural resource-intensive ones, is to 
build up a direct or indirect presence in value chains 
through alliances with importers and distributors in 
destination markets. For example, the consolidation 
of Brazilian manufacturing exports in the region has 
led to considerable growth in exports of  Brazilian 
services to different external markets in the wake of 
domestic customers. This has been found to be the 
case with financial, legal and construction services, 
among others (cni, 2007).
The purpose of  investing abroad, then, is to 
establish a greater presence in the global value networks 
associated with the main export products concerned. 
Since the region is still basically an exporter of natural 
resources, this means following the backward and 
forward linkages of the natural resource being exported 
and developing competitive advantages in the fields 
of engineering, biotechnology and related business 
services. This will allow exporters to participate in other 
new business networks, to pick up on technological 
and corporate innovation in the main markets and, 
lastly, to provide a corporate learning platform from 
which to launch more ambitious global operations. 
Thus, for example, the entry of developing-country 
suppliers, distributors and processing firms into 
global value chains depends not only on the strategy 
of transnational enterprises but also on the proactive 
internationalization policies applied by the former. The 
experience of the “trans-Latins” would repay study in 
this respect, both to modernize public-sector support 
policies for international trade and investment and 
to evaluate regional integration efforts.22 It would be 
desirable for integration mechanisms to be compatible 
with the experience of  the trans-Latins and other 
successful cases of business development.
(v) Making human resources training the 
cornerstone of changing production patterns. Attaining 
competitiveness in sectors producing something more 
than a natural resource with a low level of processing 
requires the formation of a critical mass of skilled 
human resources which, in conjunction with natural 
comparative advantages and certain minimum facilities 
in terms of infrastructure and connectivity, can attract 
local and foreign talent to participate in projects of 
global interest. While it is true that the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean are not in a position 
to form that critical mass for most products, they 
can do it for some. This would involve, for example, 
promoting the development of  local suppliers of 
specialized inputs, parts and services (design, quality 
control, logistics, distribution) in segments of  the 
value chain associated with the natural resource 
being exported. This would require the application 
21 There are several interesting examples of service exports of this 
type in the region. See, for example, eclac (2007).
22 If  there is one major integration goal that has not been achieved 
it is precisely that of building regional production chains to help 
firms compete in international markets.
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of public policies to ensure that domestic producers 
are able to comply with the relevant international 
standards. On this basis, it is possible to train skilled 
human resources in fields where the country has or 
can acquire competitive advantages, supplementing 
them with specific central or regional government 
support in education and training activities, as well 
as infrastructure and logistics. This approach has 
proved its worth in several Latin American countries, 
enabling them to attract foreign direct investment into 
technology-intensive sectors and acquire a presence 
in exports of  high-quality products and services 
(information technology and pharmaceuticals in the 
case of Costa Rica, biotechnology and information 
technology in Argentina and information technology 
and logistics in Uruguay).
This means not only considering the creation of 
massive programmes of doctoral study grants, which 
form part of the right strategy, but also a reform of 
secondary and university education, special programmes 
to develop talent, national educational support 
programmes in mathematics, English and basic science 
and public initiatives reflecting governments’ strong 
commitment to improving education quality.23
(vi) Prioritizing the intangible aspects of competitiveness. 
Production development and export promotion policies 
designed to improve sme competitiveness ought to give 
priority to improving their technological and managerial 
capabilities, staff training, compliance with international 
quality standards, collaboration with one another and 
presence in global value networks. This last item includes 
the possibility of treating firms of this type as indirect 
exporters in local value chains associated with goods 
and services exports.
(vii) Enhancing inter-agency coordination and the 
integrated policy approach. Progress with this orientation 
requires greater coordination between the different 
public institutions associated with internationalization 
support policies, i.e., between the agencies responsible 
for export promotion and diversification, inward fdi, 
technological innovation and dissemination, production 
and business development and human resources training, 
including secondary and university education.
While there is always some degree of coordination 
between government agencies, what is meant here is 
the need for them to operate on the basis of  shared 
planning encapsulating the different territorial interests 
and with well-defined responsibilities for financing, 
coordination and performance. This is what we 
find in countries that have successfully conquered a 
place for themselves in the international economy, 
invariably with a strong commitment from the main 
political authorities.
(viii) From public policies to public-private alliances. 
Last but not least, the policy criteria suggested 
require a public-private alliance as a vital institutional 
framework for progress with the work of innovation, 
competitiveness and internationalization. It is an 
alliance of this type that can provide the basis for a 
vision for the country over the next 10 or 20 years, its 
strengths and weaknesses and the tasks to be performed 
by government and by private, employers’ and labour 
organizations, respectively, if they are to jointly address 
the challenges of innovation and competitiveness. Such 
a shared diagnosis of the future, with a medium-term 
outlook transcending political cycles, makes it easier 
to determine the commitments, programmes and 
financing needs that will have to be met by public 
and private actors and to develop an integrated policy 
approach that makes inter-agency coordination a vital 
force rather than a mere formality.
(Original: Spanish)
23 A few years ago, the decision was taken in Malaysia to teach 
mathematics and basic science in English, the thinking being that 
this would be an educational asset in the global knowledge society 
(Lee, 2008).
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